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In this brief, Defendant-Appellant will be called 
"Defendant", Plaintiff-Respondent will be called "Plaintiff". 
"R" stands for Record. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In connection with their 1977 divorcer the parties made 
the property settlement agreement (the "Agreement") attached to 
the Complaint. During most of the 24 years of marriage, Defen-
dant had been President of Owanah Oil Corporation ("Owanah"). 
At divorce time, Defendant had control over valuable assets 
(principally stock in Western Oil Shale Corporation, Cayman 
Corporation and Royalty Investment Company issued in various 
names including Defendant's) much of which he claimed to belong 
to Owanah and not to be marital estate. When the Agreement was 
signed, questions about what stock was marital estate and what 
stock was Owanah1s had not been resolved. The Agreement 
provided that Defendant would, within one year, furnish an 
accounting with respect to that ownership. The Complaint 
alleges Defendant failed to furnish the accounting, seeks to 
compel it, and further seeks such damages as the Court finds 
appropriate after the allegedly delinquent accounting is made. 
Defendant claims to have made the accounting and thereafter to 
have acted in reasonable reliance on express or implied 
representations it was satisfactory. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court held it didn't matter which property 
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was Owanah's and which was Defendant's because Owanah was 
Defendant's alter ego, so all the assets which were to be the 
subject of an accounting under the Agreement were marital 
estate. Since Owanah had converted most of its assets into 
cash and used the cash in its business operations after the 
divorce, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff one 
half the amount realized from the sales. Defendant is further 
ordered to pay Plaintiff a percentage of the amount realized by 
Royalty Investment Company when Royalty sold certain real 
property. As of the date of judgment, the total ordered to be 
paid was $339,159.00. The trial court allowed no set-off for 
stock represented by certificates held by Plaintiff's attorneys 
for some time after the divorce and eventually delivered to 
Plaintiff without Defendant's consent. The trial court made no 
disposition of Defendant's counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant asks that the judgment appealed from be 
reversed and the cause remanded with instructions (1) that the 
accounting given by Defendant at the trial be recognized as 
controlling, (2) that division of marital estate as established 
by that accounting be ordered, and (3) that Plaintiff be 
ordered to properly account for the proceeds of the sale of 
real property as the Agreement requires and the counterclaim 
demands. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the trial court based its judgment on a finding 
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that Owanah is merely Defendant's alter ego, it is of primary 
importance that the Court be aware of undisputed evidence about 
Owanah. We will first review that evidence. Secondly, we will 
identify the evidence that Plaintiff has received all the 
benefits contemplated for her by the Agreement which her 
Complaint seeks to enforce. 
A. The Nature of Owanah 
Owanah is a corporation which began operations in 1952 
to engage in oil and gas exploration (R.633). The principals 
were Francois de Gunzberg and Defendant (R.635). In 1959, the 
corporation was restructured to generate capital from 
outsiders. Each of the principals contributed $300.00 and had 
his 300 previously issued shares "reissued" to him (R.635). Of 
the 300 shares to which Defendant was entitled under this 
reorganization plan, 150 were issued to him (Ex. D.27, R.634) 
and 150 to Plaintiff (R.634). At that time, 600 additional 
shares were issued to seven members of de Gunzberg1s family 
(R.636). The new stockholders purchased units at $500.00 per 
unit. Each unit was comprised of one share of stock at $100.00 
and one $400.00 debenture (R.636,7). The restructured 
corporation began life, consequently, with $300,600.00 of which 
Defendant had contributed $300.00. Subsequently, Defendant's 
brother, R.J. Colman, bought 121 shares at $100.00 per share, 
and Defendant's sister, Marian Collins, bought 143 shares at 
$100.00 per share (R.641,2). On the Agreement's date, then, 
there were 1444 Owanah shares outstanding held by 12 stock-
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holders. Plaintiff and Defendant together held approximately 
20% of those shares for which they had contributed less than 
one-tenth of one percent of Owanah's capital. 
Owanah is now engaged in a sodium brine development 
project located at the Carson Sink near Fallon, Nevada (R.637), 
leasing the land from the Southern Pacific Railroad (R.637 et 
seq, Ex. 36f37). Owanah has spent in excess of $1 million 
dollars on that project (R.689). Of the money generated from 
the sale of stock which Plaintiff claims were part of the 
marital estate, every dollar has been deposited in Owanah's 
account or the account of an Owanah subsidiary (Ex. D-34 cover-
ing 5 transactions in Cayman Corporation stock; Ex. D-40 cover-
ing 2 transactions in Western Oil Shale Corporation stock ). 
Defendant also mortgaged his Park City residence for $60,000.00, 
applied part of the proceeds to the reduction of Owanah's debt, 
and deposited the remainder in Owanah's account (R.787,8). Pay-
ments against the mortgage debt have since been made out of 
Owanah funds (Ex. P-47, sheet 5, R.788). Except for those 
mortgage payments, the total amount paid to or for defendant 
out of Owanah funds has been minimal, amounting in the period 
from November 23, 1981 through November 26, 1982, for example, 
1. These exhibits consist of brokers' confirmations that sales 
of Cayman or Wosco stock were made for Defendant's or Owanah's 
accounts. Attached to each confirmation is a bank deposit slip 
showing the exact amount of the sale proceeds was deposited to 
Owanah's account. The confirmations were produced by 
Plaintiff, the deposit slips by Defendant. 
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to $22f695.25 (Ex* P-47, R.785 et seq.). No other salary or 
expense reimbursement payments were revealed by Plaintiff's 
review of cancelled checks. 
B. Defendant's manner of conducting Owanah's business. 
Defendant began borrowing money from First Security 
Bank (the "Bank") for the conduct of Owanah's business in about 
1952 (R.unnumbered page following 637) . At the beginning, he 
made application for loans personally because Owanah's net 
worth was so small the Banks preferred to deal with Owanah's 
principals personally (R.unnumbered page following 637). and 
because adjustments in personal loans could be made without the 
time consuming formality of corporate resolutions (R.639). 
Defendant continued that practice even after Owanah had 
substantial assets, and he would list on the financial 
statement as "his" property anything in which either he or 
Owanah had an interest (R.640). The Bank was aware that the 
loans were for Owanah's use because the loan proceeds were 
deposited in Owanah's account (Defendant's testimony at R.639, 
coroborated by the Bank's Mr. Hansen at R.448,9). 
Defendant similarly avoided taking stock and leases in 
Owanah's name, even though the acquisitions were with Owanah's 
funds, including the $325,000 contributed by outside share-
holders in 1959, because brokers and purchasers required 
corporate resolutions supporting sales (R.639), and resolutions 
would entail signatures of people living in Massachusetts and 
France. Defendant nevertheless scrupulously deposited all 
income from sales of property he recognized as Owanah's - even 
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though held in his name or street name - in Owanah's bank 
accounts (Ex. P-34, Ex. P-40). Plaintiff's attorneys reviewed 
bank statements and cancelled checks for Owanah accounts for 
several years (R.757) and found only the checks itemized on 
Exhibit 47 as evidencing payments to or for Defendant as 
distinguished from checks made for clearly corporate purposes. 
The Exhibit 47 checks are the only evidence of salary or 
expense reimbursement paid to Defendant for acting as president 
of Owanah. 
C. The Agreement 
The parties were divorced in 1977 after 24 years of 
childless marriage during which Defendant was the source of 
Plaintiff's support (Agreement/ R.7f 1f8) . Putting aside 
questions about which securities under Defendant's control were 
a part of the marital estate and which were not, the 
Agreement's property settlement strongly favors Plaintiff in 
that: 
(a) Of three homes acquired by the parties during 
marriage (one on Walker's Lane in Salt Lake and two in 
Edgartown) she was given two as well as half the 
proceeds from her sale of the third (Agreement, R.13, 
Is 1, 10, 12). 
(b) She was given all stock held in her name 
(Agreement, R.13 IfT) including 150 shares of Owanah 
(R.479) . 
(c) She was given the parties entire interest in a 
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building lot in Edgartown (R.15 1fl8) . 
(d) She was given one-half of all other realty in 
which the parties were known to have an interest 
(Agreement, R. 13-16). 
(e) She was given one-half of any stock owned by 
Defendant (R.13 1f7) and, in the event any of that stock 
was pledged to secure "any personal or corporate loan", 
he was obligated to pay off the indebtedness (R.14). 
(f) Despite having been given more than half the 
agreed marital estate, she was given alimony of $500.00 
per month (R.7 If8> 
P. The Accounting. 
Within one year after the Agreement, Defendant did 
furnish an accounting as the Agreement requires by making the 
same explanation to Roe & Fowler about the source of funds for 
acquisition of the stock and other property as he made to the 
Court during trial (R.419, 727-729). He made the explanation 
to Paul Landis of the Roe-Fowler firm, and made the kind of 
record Mr. Landis thought appropriate (R.419). In connection 
with the accounting and at the time of the divorce, all the 
certificates then in the parties' safety deposit box were taken 
out of the box, delivered into the custody of Roe & Fowler and 
kept by Roe & Fowler for implementation of the terms of the 
Agreement (R.727). 
On August 27, 1978, shortly after the year within which 
Defendant was required to account, Roe & Fowler released some 
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of the certificates in its custody to Defendant. To document 
the release, Roe & Fowler prepared a "Receipt" for Ovanah's 
signature, not Defendant's (R.47,48, R.729, Ex.P-8). That 
receipt declares that the shares released are "owned by 
Owanah." An original is retained by Roe & Fowler (Ex* P-22). 
Between August 27, 1978 (when Roe & Fowler released certifi-
cates to Owanah) and May 29, 1980, (when the Complaint was 
filed), Plaintiff made no demand on Defendant for further 
accounting and in no way indicated dissatisfaction with the 
accounting provided (R.728) . 
E. What the accounting shows about ownership of disputed 
property. 
The dispute is over the ownership of Cayman Corporation 
stock, Western Oil Shale Corporation stock, and real property 
in Cache County known as the "Anderson Ranch." 
Western Oil Shale Corporation ("WOSCO") Stock 
The Wosco stock was issued in about 1964 in consid-
eration of Owanah's transfer to Wosco of Owanah's interest in 
oil shale leases for which Owanah paid the filing fees and 
rentals (R.690). The shares were issued, at Owanah's request, 
in various names other than Owanah's so Owanah could more 
easily sell or otherwise deal with it. (R.639,691). Defendant 
claimed ten percent of 22,560 shares so issued, or 2,256 
shares, as his compensation from Owanah for making the deal 
(R.692). He admits Plaintiff is entitled to half of that 2,256 
shares. No part of the funds expended to acquire or maintain 
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the leases transferred to Wosco came from the parties1 personal 
accounts. 
Cayman Corporation ("Cayman") Stock 
The Cayman stock was issued by Cayman as consideration 
for the transfer to Cayman of all outstanding shares in 
National Oil Shale Corporation (R.642). The National Oil Shale 
shares had previously been issued to its stockholders as 
consideration for the transfer to National Oil Shale of oil 
shale leases which had been acquired by Owanah and Max Lewis 
(R.646), and an oil and gas lease with a producing oil well 
which had been paid for by James Menor, Dale Coenan, and R.J. 
Colman (R.647). The oil shale lease rentals had been paid by 
Owanah (R.648, Ex.D-30, Ex.D-31). When National Oil Shale 
certificates were issued, all those representing consideration 
for the oil and gas leasef 1500 shares, were issued to 
Defendantf but he took them as trustee for Menor, Coenan and 
R.J. Colman (R.647), and he satisfied his fiduciary obligation 
to the beneficiaries (R.652). The National shares issued as 
consideration for the oil shale leases were issued to Max Lewis 
and his family members and to Defendant (R.643, Ex.D-28). The 
shares were issued to Defendant rather than to Owanah for the 
same reason Owanah took most of its assets in officers or 
street name. When Cayman shares were issued in exchange for 
National shares, the Cayman certificates were issued to the 
persons named on the National certificates submitted for 
exchange. 
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Anderson Ranch 
The Anderson Ranch was never owned by either Owanah or 
Defendantf it was owned by Royalty Investment Company 
("Royalty"). Royalty was formed as a corporation in 1958 
(R.721). It acquired a contract to purchase the Anderson Ranch 
in about 1962 (R.722) some 15 years before Defendant bcame an 
officer and director (R.721). The installment payments on the 
Ranch were made by R.J. Colmanf M.G. Collins and Owanah 
(R.722). As a result of their having made those payments and 
having assigned royalties to Royalty, R.J. Colman, M.G. Collins 
and Owanah became entitled to 62-1/2 percent of the outstanding 
stock in Royalty (R.549 et seq). None of the money for making 
installment payments came from Defendants personal funds 
(R.723). 
In January 1982, Royalty sold the Anderson Ranch for 
$250,000.00 and authorized the proceeds to be utilized by 
Owanah in the Carson Sink development (Ex. P-48, R.777)f 
Royalty having an option to demand the return of its money plus 
interest or take a 4% overriding royalty interest in product 
from the project (Ex.P-48). The trial court ordered Defendant 
to pay Plaintiff a sum equal to one-half of 62 1/2% of the 
amount Royalty realized from the sale of the Ranch. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
"ALTER EGO" WAS NOT AN ISSUE FRAMED BY THE PLEADINGS 
OR OTHERWISE PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR 
RESOLUTION, AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
BASING ITS DECISION ON AN ALTER EGO LEGAL THEORY. 
The entire foundation of the judgment in this case was 
the trial court's finding that "the corporation is merely 
Defendant's alter egof and the assets claimed to be owned by 
Owanah Oil Corporation are in fact owned by Defendant" (Finding 
No. 14, R.371; memorandum decision R.266). No alter ego issue 
was, we submit, raised by the pleadings or tried by express or 
implied consent of Defendant. 
The Complaint in this matter alleges that Defendant 
failed to furnish to Plaintiff an "accounting of stocks owned 
by him or in which he has any interest", ^nd seeks to compel 
one. It is noteworthy that the evidence indicates no question 
about the identity of the stocks to which the accounting would 
relate. The stock was represented by certificates some of 
which were delivered to and kept by Roe & Fowler and the 
remainder of which were held by the Bank as security for a 
loan. Defendant's testimony is undisputed that he delivered 
all the certificates from the parties' safety deposit box to 
Roe & Fowler and told Roe & Fowler about the pledged 
securities. The Agreement itself recognizes that certain 
stocks "owned by" Defendant might have been collateralized for 
"personal and corporate loans." If any of that loan collateral 
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is Defendant's stock, the Agreement says, the payment of the 
loan will be Defendant's responsibility, and Plaintiff will get 
her half free of the loan burden. That provision is consistent 
only with an understanding that the loans were really corporate 
obligations, should have been secured only by corporate 
property, and that Defendant's stock was marital estate free 
from such obligation. 
The case presumably went to trial on the issue framed 
by the pleadings: Had Defendant furnished an adequate ccounting 
identifying which of the stocks in Roe & Fowler and Bank 
custody at the time of the Agreement belonged in the marital 
estate and which did not? The expectation was that, if Judge 
Dee concluded the accounting was not adequate, he would order a 
more painstaking or better verified accounting and defer any 
ruling on damages until an accounting to his specifications was 
made* In the course of trial, Defendant testified about the 
accounting he had furnished, explaining to the Court as he had 
to Plaintiff's lawyers that most of the property in question 
had been acquired in the course of Owanah's operation using 
capital contributed by outside investor stockholders. His 
testimony was corroborated by the evidence that all proceeds 
from sale of any stock by Defendant or Owanah had been 
deposited in Owanah's account and used for Owanah's purposes. 
The only contrary evidence was that he had listed the stocks 
and other property on his financial statements as his property 
when borrowing money which everyone knew was for Owanah's 
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purposes and which was deposited in Owanah's account. The 
Court found thatf even assuming everything Defendant said was 
true, all the property in question was still marital estate 
because Owanah is merely Defendant's alter ego* 
The pleadings do not frame an alter ego issue. It is 
not alleged that there is such "unity of interest and 
ownership" with respect to the property in dispute that the 
separate identities of Defendant and Owanah should be ignored. 
It is not alleged (nor does the evidence show) that Plaintiff 
believed or relied on representations that the stock in 
question was all Defendant's and none Owanah's so that gross 
inequity would result from recognizing the separate identities 
of Owanah and Defendant. At no point in the course of trial 
i 
did Plaintiff's counsel use the phrase "alter ego". 
Interrogation of Defendant at trial and before was always 
directed toward eliciting from Defendant an explanation of his 
justification for listing as his property assets he really 
believed to be Owanah's, and to lead him to say something which 
could be construed as an admission against interest. Nothing 
about the interrogation put Defendant on notice that an alter 
ego theory would suddenly be expressed after the parties rested 
and the trial was concluded. 
While Rule 15 is liberally construed to free litigants 
from legalistic restrictions in the presentation of their 
causes, it does not justify the introduction of new theories of 
action after the evidence is in. In Mitchell v Palmer, 240 
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P.2d 970, 1210 245 (1952), the Plaintiff undertook to set aside 
certain deeds on the grounds of fraud in inducing their 
execution. At trial, Plaintiff attempted to adduce evidence of 
non-delivery. This Court held the Plaintiff was properly held 
to the legal theory expressed in her Complaint. 
A number of federal cases have held that implied 
consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue will not be inferred 
merely because evidence relevant to the unpleaded issue, as 
well as an issue framed by the pleadings, was introduced 
without objection. An unpleaded issue is not tried by implied 
consent unless it is obvious from the evidence being offered 
that the offering party intends to raise a new issue. In MBI 
Motor Co. v Lotus/East, CA Tenn 1974, 506 F.2d 709, the Court 
said it must "appear that the parties understood the evidence" 
relating to the unpleaded issue "was aimed at the unpleaded 
issue." This is not the case when the evidence in question is 
also relevant to pleaded issues. Avco Corp. v Am. Tel & Tel, 
DC Ohio 1975, 68 FRD 532, Wirtz v FM Sloan, DC Pa 1968, 285 
F.Supp. 669, aff. 411 F.2d 56. 
In two recent cases, Pohl Const. Co. v Marshall, CA 10 
1981, 640 F.2d 266, and Cioffi v Morris, CA Fla 1982, 678 F.2d 
53 9, the federal courts have ruled that implied consent will 
not be found if the Defendant could have offered additional 
evidence had he been aware of the unpleaded theory. In this 
case, Defendant could have adduced evidence that Plaintiff was 
always aware that most of the stock in question was acquired 
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with Owanah assets including the capital of outside investors 
and that Plaintiff did not regard it as marital estate. 
Defendant was unable to do so because Plaintiff was not present 
at the trial. Defendant would not have waived her attendance 
if he had been aware that judgment would be sought on any 
previously unexpressed legal theory. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF ALTER EGO HAD BEEN PUT IN ISSUE, THE EVIDENCE 
CANNOT SUSTAIN THE FINDING MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
This Court hasf in recent yearsf considered three cases 
in which alter ego was the basis of trial court judgment, 
Dockstader v Walker, 29 U.2d 370, 510 P.2d 526, 1973; Norman v 
Murray First Thrift, 508 P.2d 1028, Utah 1975; and Centurian 
Corp. v Fiberchem Inc., 562 P.2d 1252, Utah 1977. In each of 
those cases, a trial court judgment based on alter ego findings 
was reversed, or a trial court refusal to apply alter ego was 
affirmed. 
The circumstances which must co-exist to justify 
application of the alter ego doctrine are best stated in 
Norman. Using language which recurs in cases from many 
2 
jurisdictions, this Court there said: 
To disregard the corporate entity, there must be a 
concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there must be 
such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exist...and (2) the observance of the corporate 
IT. Cases discussing alter ego concepts are digested in the 
West System under Corporations Key 1.4. There are hundreds 
digested in the Ninth Dicennial alone. Norman well capsulizes 
their teaching. 
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form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an 
unequitable result would follow. 
A. Is there unity of ownership in this case? 
For the most part, unity of ownership and interest is 
found only where allf or practically allf of the stock in the 
corporation is owned by the individual. In Dockstader, this 
Court observed that the alter ego doctrine is generally applied 
where the corporation is a "one man corporation in the sense 
that the individual owns all or practically all" of the stock. 
In that situation, there is, of course, "unity of ownership and 
interest" since there is no third party who can assert a right 
to share in the profits of corporate enterprise or the proceeds 
from liquidation of corporate property on dissolution. The 
unity of interest requirement has occasionally been satisfied 
by a showing that third party stockholders hold stock under 
fiduciary obligation to the dominant stockholder. We find no 
cases, however, upholding a unity of ownership finding where 
the individual owns a small minority of the outstanding shares, 
and the third parties holding the majority of the shares 
contributed most of the corporate capital. In this case, 
Defendant owns about ten percent of Owanah1s shares, and the 
majority shareholders contributed 99% of the corporate capital. 
By finding unity of ownership and interest as between Owanah 
and Defendant in this case, the trial court ruled as a matter 
of law that Owanah's majority shareholders had no interest or 
ownership in the property acquired with their capital. 
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B. Where are the equities? 
A great many cases emphasize that the mere fact that 
the individual owns all the stock (Ramsey v Adams, 603 P.2d 
1025, 4 Kan App 2d 662, 1979) or is the dominant influence in 
forming corporate policy (Goetz v Goetz, 567 SW 2d 892, Tex 
1978) does notf by itselff justify disregarding the corporate 
entity. There is nothing illegal or contrary to public policy 
about a corporation's being a one man operation. It is only 
when the individual uses the corporation to achieve an illegal 
or fraudulent objective that courts will undertake to pierce 
the corporate veil. 
Norman speaks in general terms of the alter ego 
doctrinefs purpose to promote equity. The cases which treat 
specifics almost universally require a plaintiff to prove the 
elements of fraud. In Roderick Timber Co. v Willopa Harbor 
Cedar Products, 627 P.2d 1352, 29 Wash App 311 (1981), the 
court declared that the separate identity of the corporation 
will be honored "unless its recognition serves to perpetrate 
some form of injustice, which typically involves fraud, 
misrepresentation, or manipulation to a creditor's detriment." 
In Centurion Corp, (supra), this Court characterized what a 
plaintiff must prove as "something akin to fraud." 
While the evidence in this case may show that Defendant 
misrepresented his assets to the Bank, it certainly does not 
show any misrepresentation to Plaintiff. There is no evidence 
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that she ever saw any financial statement submitted with an 
Owanah loan application. She neither alleged nor testified 
that Defendant ever represented to her that all the stock in 
dispute was his and none Owanah's. She neither alleged nor 
testified that Defendant ever spent any of the parties1 money 
to acquire Cayman or Wosco stock, to acquire royalty interestsf 
or to make Anderson Ranch payments* She has provided no 
evidentiary basis for her contention that her claim to the 
assets in controversy is superior to the claims of the other 
Owanah shareholders who contributed so much more to corporate 
capital than she did. 
The evidence does not show any manipulation of 
corporate assets resulting in Defendant's enrichment or self 
aggrandizement. On the contrary. Defendant has utilized all 
proceeds from corporate property sales in attempting to realize 
corporate objectives, and Owanahfs success will benefit 
Plaintiff, who holds more Owanah shares than Defendant, more 
than it will benefit Defendant. He has been paid minimally for 
managing the corporation. It is inconceivable that, had 
Defendant considered the assets which were sold to have been 
his personal property, he would have deposited all the sales 
proceeds in Owanahfs account. 
It is difficult to perceive the injustice which will 
result if the corporate identity is honored in this case. 
Plaintiff will have received, even if the judgment is reversed, 
her support during 24 years of marriage, a house on Walker's 
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Lane in Salt Lakef a house in Edgartown, a building lot in 
Edgartownf half of all real and personal property Defendant, as 
distinguished from Owanahf owned, and $500.00 per month in 
alimony. 
It is not difficult to perceive, however, the injustice 
which will result from this Courtfs sustaining the trial 
court's judgment. Defendant has risked all his assets, as well 
as Owanah's, on the Carson Sink project. #e even mortgaged his 
house in Park City to keep Owanah solvent. The one asset on 
which Plaintiff can presumably execute is the Carson Sink 
plant, in which the trial court has declared Owanah's 
stockholders other than the parties have no interest. 
Plaintiff, who has made no investment at all in Owanah or the 
project, will then take, under what was ostensibly a divorce 
decree, everything of value which has derived from the 
investment by others of more than $300,000.00. She will have 
achieved that goal, moreover, in an action to which Owanah was 
never named as a party, and in which the investors were never 
served. The investors had no reason to suppose their invest-
ment was in jeopardy and no chance to defend it. 
The trial court in effect held that, when a loan 
applicant files a financial statement with a bank, he 
guarantees the accuracy of the statement to all the world. 
Moreover, any property represented to be the applicant's on his 
statement becomes his as a matter of law without regard to what 
the public records may show and without regard to the equities 
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of third parties* 
POINT III 
BY APPLYING ALTER EGO, THE TRIAL COURT HAS CONSTRUED 
THE AGREEMENT TO EFFECT A PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION OUT OF 
HARMONY WITH THE PARTIES' INTENT. 
The Complaint in this action prays for (1) an order 
compelling Defendant to accountf and (2) for such damages as 
the accounting shows Plaintiff to have sustained. The 
fundamental judicial concern, consequently, is to assure that 
the "equitable" distribution of their property which the 
Agreement contemplates is achieved* By applying alter ego 
doctrine here, the trial court has construed the agreement to 
achieve a distribution which could never have been intended by 
Defendant, and which is much more favorable to Plaintiff than 
she, on the evidence, could rationally have expected,, 
It is simply beyond credit that Defendant would 
voluntarily have consented to the division of property which 
occurs if the corporate entity is disregarded. Even if the 
corporate entity is honored, Plaintiff received, under the 
Agreement, significantly more than half of the property which 
is unquestionably marital estate, and she is awarded $500.00 
per month alimony. If the corporate entity is ignored, she 
receives in addition one half of all property acquired by 
Owanah in the utilization of outside investor capital in some 
15 years of operation. Not only does she realize that bonanza, 
she realizes it free of obligation to pay any of the debt which 
corporate property had been pledged to secure. 
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It is clear from the language of the Agreement and 
Plaintiff's subsequent conduct that she anticipated no such cut 
of Owanahfs assets. The Agreement recognizes that there is 
3 
corporate debt and stock pledged to secure it. If any of 
that stock is shown by Defendant's accounting to be Defendant's 
personal propertyf says the Agreement, Defendant will assume 
the responsibility of freeing it. Such provisions are 
consistent only with the parties' understanding that, as 
between themf it was not fair for marital estate property to be 
pledged for corporate debt. 
Finally, there is the convincing evidence of Exhibit 
P-8 that, within the time frame contemplated by the Agreement 
for accounting, Plaintiff acknowledged that stock held by Roe & 
Fowler was corporate property. Throughout the period of 
attempted implementation of the accounting provisions of the 
Agreement, Plaintiff demonstrated her recognition that there Is 
an Owanah, that its property is to be differentiated from 
Defendant's, and that Defendant's responsibility is only to 
establish the basis for differentiation. 
3. The Agreement was prepared by Plaintiff's attorneys. 
Defendant was never represented by counsel. Consequently this 
instrument should be construed, everything else being equal, 
most favorably to Defendant. 
-22-
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT DEFENDANT FURNISHED 
AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNTING SATISFACTORY TO HER 
A. Review of facts relating to estoppel 
Defendant testified that, within the year the Agreement 
gives him for furnishing an accounting, he met with Paul Landis 
of Roe & Fowler, gave him the same information and documen-
tation about property ownership as he gave the court at trial, 
and left with the understanding that Roe & Fowler, at least, 
were satisfied with his identification of marital estate pro-
perty and his explanation for categorizing all other property 
of concern as Ownah's. On August 27, 1978, approximately a 
month after the year had expired, Owanah asked Roe & Fowler to 
release some of the certificates held by that firm as having 
been established to be Owanahfs property. In the interim 
between the Defendant's meeting with Mr. Landis and the August 
27 request, there was adequate time for Plaintiff to have been 
apprised of the accounting and express any dissatisfaction. 
Roe & Fowler did not, in writing or otherwise, dispute 
Owanah1s right to the certificates sought to be released. The 
certificates were released to Owanah and their receipt was 
documented by an instrument prepared by Roe & Fowler which 
declares the released stock to belong to Owanah. 
That conduct by Plaintiff, through her lawyers, has 
implications beyond the context of the release transaction. 
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Roe & Fowler held the certificates to assure that, when the 
accounting was furnished, there would be certificates readily 
available for delivery to Plaintiff. The release of any of 
those certificates would make no sense unless Plaintiff was 
satisfied that the remaining certificates covered what she was 
entitled to receive as marital estate. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff's attorneys were fully 
aware of the stock held by the Bank and that, however it was 
listed on Defendant's financial statements, it was pledged for 
personal and corporate debt. It is unconceivable that she 
could have believed Owanah would not continue to use the 
pledged assets as it always had unless she raised some 
objection to the accounting. Owanah in fact paid the secured 
debt, sold much of the stock, and spent the proceeds on the 
Carson Sink development. It is of critical significance, we 
submit, that all of the utilization of Wosco and Cayman stock 
by Defendant for Owanah occurred contemporaneously with 
Defendant's furnishing an accounting to Roe & Fowler and 
obtaining a release of part of the stock escrowed with them. 
Defendant proceeded on the assumption that his accounting was 
satisfactory, and that Owanah was justified in using the 
property now claimed by Plaintiff for Owariah's business 
purposes. One wonders what else Plaintiff or her attorneys 
expected when they released Owanah stock. Moreover, for two 
years after the accounting was due under the Agreement (and was 
furnished according to the undisputed evidence) and almost two 
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years after Plaintiff, by releasing escrowed stock, implied her 
concurrence in the accounting, Plaintiff did nothing to suggest 
that she disputed Defendants identification of marital estate. 
She made no demand for additional documentation, and she 
certainly gave no indication of her present contention that no 
accounting at all had been furnished. 
B. Application of estoppel doctrine to facts 
The concept of estoppel in pais is that one should not 
"be permitted to speak against his own acts, representations of 
commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and 
who reasonably relied thereon11 (28 AmJur 2d 629, Estoppel §28). 
This Court has had frequent occasion to comment on the 
doctrine and identify its elements. The most concise and 
comprehensive statement is the following from Morgan v Board of 
State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 1976: 
Estoppel arises when a party by his actions, represen-
sentations, or admissions, or by his silence when he 
ought to speak, intentionally or through culpable 
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to 
exist and that such other, acting with reasonable 
prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon so that 
he will suffer injustice if former is permitted to deny 
existence of such facts. 
The Washington Court explains the doctrine in language which 
more precisely applies to the circumstances of this case. 
Equitable estoppel may arise where there exists a 
statement or act inconsistent with a later asserted 
claim, an action by the relying party on the faith of 
such statement or act and resulting injury to the 
relying party if the party making the representation 
were permitted to contradict or repudiate the statement 
or act. City of Mercer Island v Steinmann, 513 P.2d 80, 
9 Wash.App. 479. 
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The elements of estoppel are (1) representation and (2) reason-
able reliance resulting in detriment. 
The Representation 
It is well settled that the representation giving rise 
to estoppel need not be express; it may be inferred from the 
positive conduct or silence of the party against whom it is 
asserted. Morgan v Board of State Landsy (supra); Grover v 
Garn, 23 U.2d 441, 464 P.2d 598f 1970. In this casef the 
evidence shows both affirmative conduct inconsistent with 
Plaintiff's present claim and silence in the face of an 
obligation to speak. 
Plaintiff's claim as expressed in her complaint is that 
Defendant failed to furnish an accounting. As expressed in her 
post trial memorandum for the first time. Plaintiff's claim is 
that there is no Owanah, Owanah being only Defendant's alter 
ego. The fact that Plaintiff released a part of the escrowed 
stock and did so by a document which declares Owanah's owner-
ship of that stock is inconsistent with her present claims that 
no accounting had been furnished and that no Owanah exists. 
The release and Receipt confirm not only that the parties 
negotiated their settlement with an underlying understanding 
that there jjs an Owanah whose property is to be differentiated 
from Defendant's, but also that the whole point of accounting 
was to make such differentiation. 
Estoppel arises here, however, not only from 
Plaintiff's affirmative act acknowledging that an accounting 
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has been made, that escrowed stock should be released on the 
basis of that accounting, and that Owanah has independent 
existence, it also arises from Plaintiff's silence for two 
years when she must be presumed to have known that Defendant, 
as Owanah's president, would be using Owanah1s assets in the 
conduct of Owanahfs business unless Plaintiff asserted her 
ownership. She said nothing to Defendant or, so far as the 
record shows, to the Bank about any claim of right to pledged 
stock which survived Defendant's accounting. On the evidence, 
she cannot deny that she knew about the stock in Bank custody. 
The Agreement speaks about pledged property, and Defendant's 
testimony that he told Mr. Landis about the pledged stock is 
undisputed. 
On the legal implications of silence, the authors of 
American Jurisprudence say this: 
Estoppel by silence or inaction is often referred to 
as estoppel by "standing by", and that phrase in this 
connection has almost lost its primary significance of 
actual presence or participaton in the transaction and 
generally covers any silence where there are knowledge 
and a duty to make a disclosure* The principle 
underlying such estoppels is embodied in the maxim "one 
who is silent when he ought to speak will not be heard 
to speak when he ought to be silent." Silence, when 
there is a duty to speak, is deemed equivalent to 
concealment. Moreover, there are cases where the mere 
silence of the estopped party and his failure to assert 
the right later claimed will be construed as a 
representation that he does not have the rights which 
he later attempts to assert. 28 AmJur 2d 666 Estoppel 
and Waiver §53 
Defendant's Reliance 
There can be little question about Defendant's 
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reasonable reliance on the release of escrowed stock as an 
acknowledgement that Owanah owned it* That's exactly what the 
Receipt says. Had the certificates not been released, Owanah 
could not have sold the shares and used the proceeds in Carson 
Sink development* Defendant also reasonably interpreted Plain-
tiff's failure to object to his accounting, particularly when 
she released escrowed shares based upon it, as a concurrence in 
its identification of marital state. There is no contradiction 
in the record of Defendant's testimony that he made the 
accounting, made it within the year prescribed, and document-
ed it as Mr. Landis asked. There is no suggestion in the 
record that Mr. Landis is unavailable to testify. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 22 shows that Roe & Fowler took the Exhibit 8 Receipt. 
The record reveals no effort by Owanah or Defendant to dispose 
of any property until the accounting was made and its adequacy 
impliedly acknowledged. Only then did Owanah undertake to 
convert property into cash and all the cash was deposited in 
Owanah's account and used for corporate purposes. 
Finally, it is appropriate to comment on the signifi-
cance of Plaintiff's intent when she released the stock 
and remained silent when she knew what property Defendant had 
identified as marital estate. It is not essential for 
invocation of the estoppel doctrine that the party sought to be 
estopped had an intent to deceive. It need only be true that 
the representation related to a fact which the party claiming 
estoppel might assume to be true and act on that assumption. 
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Kelly v Richards, 95 Utah 560f 83 P2d 731f 129 ALR 164f 1938. 
Plaintiff impliedly represented that Defendant's 
accounting was satisfactory and that Owanah and Defendant have 
separate identities. Defendant relied on that representation 
in dealing, as Owanahfs president, with property accounted for 
as Owanah1s. If Plaintiff is allowed to repudicate her 
representation, Defendant will suffer injury in the amount of 
the judgment against him in this action. 
It is not fair or even conscionable to permit Plaintiff 
to wait for more than two years after the accounting should 
have been and was made, see what disposition of property was 
made, and then decide whether to claim all that property as 
marital estate. 
POINT V 
THE ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF AN 
AMOUNT REPRESENTING A PERCENTAGE OF THE PRICE FOR WHICH 
THE ANDERSON RANCH WAS SOLD IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, OR EVIDENCE. 
The evidence that title to the Anderson Ranch was, at 
the time of the parties1 divorce, vested in Royalty Investment 
Company is undisputed. Plaintiff presumably claims that 
Royalty held that title in some kind of trust capacity, and 
that the parties had a beneficial interest. When Royalty sold 
the Ranch, under Plaintifffs legal theory, Royalty had an 
obligation to distribute the proceeds to the cestuis and no 
authority to extend the trust by managing the sale proceeds for 
the cestuis. The trial court ordered Defendant to pay 
Plaintiff one-half the amount which it expressly or impliedly 
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found should have been distributed by Royalty to Owanah or 
Defendant. 
That segment of the judgment is erroneous in these 
respects: 
1. The basis for any claimed trust is not set out in 
the Complaint or any amendment to it. 
2. There is no finding or conclusion which establishes 
the legal basis for any Royalty obligation to distibute to its 
shareholders the proceeds from any sales of its property. 
3. The entity claimed to have violated the trust is not 
made a party to the suit. 
4. The only evidence of beneficial interest held by 
the parties is Defendant's testimony thatf because Owanahf R.J. 
Colman and M.C. Collins contributed money with which payments 
on the Ranch were made, they were entitled to 62 1/2% of the 
"stock" or "equity" in Royalty. The judgment, without 
evidentiary justification, assigns all of R.J. Colman1s and 
M.C. Collins' interest to Owanah and consequently to Defendant. 
5. While there jLs a finding that Owanah is Defendant's 
alter ego, there is no finding that Royalty is. There is merely 
a finding that Defendant "held title to 62 1/2% interest in the 
Ranch through Royalty Investment Company." 
The trial court's ruling, carried to its logical 
extreme, sets a precedent which leads to absurdity. Plaintiff 
is entitled under the judgment to half of Owanah's stock in 
Royalty, and she retains her equity as a stockholder in any 
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property Royalty acquired with the proceeds of the Ranch sale. 
Nevertheless, said the trial court, every time Royalty sells an 
asset. Defendant must pay Plaintiff one half of 62 1/2% of the 
sales price. In every case, then, where stock is distributed in a 
divorce decree, the defendant may be ordered to pay the plaintiff 
some percentage of the price received by the stock issuer whenever 
the issuer sells any of its property. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment in this case effects a property 
distribution which could never have been in the parties1 
contemplation when they made the Agreement, and it distributes to 
Plaintiff property in which Owanah's investor stockholders have 
vastly stronger ownership equities than Plaintiff without 
affording them opportunity to protect themselves. On both 
procedural and substantive grounds, alter ego was improperly 
applied. The judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of August, 1985. 
'Fr&nk J. Allen ( J 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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